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This paper analyzes the vulnerability of the banking industry in advanced
and emerging economic to shocks originated in or transmitted by banks in
a foreign area under stressed and non-stressed conditions. The main aim is
to measure cross-country sensitivities that feature systemic contagion in the
international banking system and characterize how systemic shocks are
propagated. To this end, we estimate the sensitivity of the expected-loss func-
tion in the local banking industry to contemporaneous shocks in foreign ex-
pected-loss functions in a dynamic equation system during the period De-
cember 1999 through November 2013, after controlling for global exposures
to common factors, and considering stressed and non-stressed economic sce-
narios. We implement instrumental estimation to ensure robust estimates
against endogeneity and characterize impulse-response functions to appraise
the expected duration of tail-contagion. Our study reveals that cross-country
vulnerabilities exhibit strong state-dependent patterns which largely increase
during periods of distress. During tranquil or normal periods, shocks cause
minor or no significant impacts are quickly absorbed by the domestic systems.
Under stressed market conditions, however, even idiosyncratic shocks can
trigger a pronounced response in other areas with effects that tend to last over
long periods of time. Our analysis also reveals the existence of directionality
in cross-border contagion, with the US banking sector being the greatest source
of financial contagion worldwide and, simultaneously, being more resilient
than other areas. Furthermore, systematic exposures to Central EMU area are
largely significant than Peripheral Europe, being US the most vulnerable coun-
try to shocks originating in Central EMU. Finally, US and Eurozone are sen-
sitive to shocks in Emerging banking system.
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F inancial contagion has received considerable attention in empirical finance. Themain interest in this literature is to analyze how shocks to prices are transmittedamong different financial assets. Early papers analyzed Granger-type causal re-lationships in the conditional mean of returns; see, for instance, Eun and Shim(1989), Becker et al. (1990), Longstaff (2010) and Cheung et al. (2010). Subse -
quent studies analyzed causality in variance and time-varying conditional correlations,
aiming to detect spillovers in volatility; see, among others, Hamao et al. (1990), En-
gle et al. (1990), King and Wadhwani (1990), Susmel and Engle (1994), Baele (2005),
and Dungey et al. (2005). More recently, the global financial crisis has originated a con-
siderable interest in understanding the empirical linkages that interconnect losses of
financial institutions during periods of distress. The financial crisis, albeit initiated in
the US subprime mortgage-backed securities market, resulted in the systemic collapse
of major institutions worldwide, motivating a new international regulatory setting and
a fast-growing literature devoted to systemic-risk modelling; see, among others, Sego-
viano and Goodhart (2009), Acharya et al. (2010), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011),
Brownlees and Engle (2012), López-Espinosa et al. (2012, 2015), Diebold and Yilmaz
(2012), Kim and Hwang (2012), and Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013).
In this paper, we address contagion in the tails of daily returns of representa-
tive indices of the banking industry in several economic areas around the world. Our
main aim is to appraise the sensitivity that characterizes domestic vulnerabilities to
shocks originated in or transmitted by foreign banks under different economic con-
ditions. Cross-country contagion in the banking industry typically occurs because
large-scale banks hold an important proportion of claims on foreign borrowers over
total assets in their balance sheets. As a result, a shock in a foreign counterparty that
decreases the market value of these claims can lead to a balance-sheet contraction
which may be further transmitted into the domestic system through the local inter-
bank network. In our analysis, we characterize cross-country vulnerabilities by es-
timating the network of bilateral sensitivities of the expected-loss function of local
banks to contemporaneous shocks in the expected-loss functions of foreign banks
at the 1% shortfall probability level. To this end, we estimate a system of dynamic
equations, controlling for global exposures to common factors, and considering
stressed and non-stressed economic scenarios which are endogenously determined
by the conditional distribution of expected losses in the local industry. In contrast
to most studies in the previous literature, we explicitly deal with the problem of en-
dogeneity and reverse causality that characterizes contemporaneous contagion us-
ing instrumental-based estimation to ensure consistent estimation. Finally, we char-
acterize the impulse- response functions (IRF henceforth) embedded in the dynamic
system to determine the rapidity, intensity, and persistence of systemic tail-contagion.
This analysis provides a quantitative assessment of the systemic relevance of the bank-
ing industry in each economic area, identifies the main transmission channels of con-
tagion, and characterizes how shocks are propagated in the global banking system.
More specifically, we focus on representative indices of the banking industry in
individual countries, such as US and UK, and different economic areas that include
peripheral and non-peripheral countries in Western Europe and emerging-market eco -
nomies around the world. The dataset is directly available from Datastream and spans
the period December 1999 through November 2013, including several episodes of ex-
pansion and financial recession that caused considerable distress in the banking sec-
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tor, more prominently, during the 2007-2009 global recession and the 2010 European
sovereign debt crisis. We characterize cross-border contagion in the left tails of the
conditional distribution of daily returns of these indices building on a variant of the
two-stage quantile-regression methodology (henceforth 2SQR) proposed by Adams
et al. (2014). Analyzing tail-interdependences requires suitable estimates of the la-
tent conditional loss process. While the analysis in Adams et al. (2014) is conducted
on GARCH-type estimates of the VaR process of US institutions, a specific contri-
bution of this paper is to extend this analysis to cope with Expected Shortfall (ES
henceforth) in an international sample. In particular, we characterize ES in the eco-
nomic areas under study at the usual 1% regulatory shortfall probability using the ex-
pectile-based model suggested by Taylor (2008a). This approach is particularly con-
venient in our context because it does not require specification of the underlying
distribution of returns. This property preserves the semiparametric nature of the 2SQR
methodology and, as a result, the main conclusions are not driven by or sensitive to
a specific assumption on the formally unknown distribution of returns.
Our analysis provides specific insight into the degree of vulnerability of the ban -
king industry in the main economic areas under study, characterizing how financial
contagion of extreme losses occurs. Whereas the existence of tail-interconnections
in the financial industry has been discussed in the extant literature, the methodolog-
ical analysis implemented in most of these papers distinctively focus on a single di-
rection of contagion: Either from individual banks to the total system (e.g., Adrian
and Brunnermeir 2011; López- Espinosa et al. 2012) in the study of individual con-
tributions to systemic risk, or from the system to individual banks (e.g., Acharya et
al. 2010) in the analysis of individual exposures to systemic risk. In relation to these
studies, this paper provides a more detailed picture because it characterizes the net-
work of bilateral relationships among banks in an international sample explicitly rec-
ognizing the possibility of feedback effects in a dynamic equation system. This is
particularly important because shocks can be propagated indirectly. Similarly, while
the topic of cross-country contagion has received considerable attention in the af-
termath of the financial crisis (see, for instance, Buchholz and Tonzer 2013, and
Ballester et al. 2014 for recent studies relying on different methodologies), most of
these papers ignore the crucial dependence of this phenomenon on time-varying mar-
ket conditions. The 2SQR methodology implemented in this paper allows us to rec-
ognize different responses characterizing the intensity and duration of tail-spillovers
during downturning or expansive cycles of the economy.
Our paper reveals a number of outstanding empirical features. Consistent with
previous studies, cross- country vulnerabilities exhibit a considerable degree of state-
dependency featured by sensitivity coefficients which largely increase during peri-
ods of distress; see, for instance, King and Wadhwani (1990), Ang et al. (2006), and
Ludwig and Sobański (2014). According to the estimates of the system, under nor-
mal market conditions –characterized by the median of the conditional distribution
of local ES– a one percent increase in the ES of the US banking system increases
directly the ES of the so-called CE area (formed by all EMU countries except Por-
tugal, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain) in just 0.01 percentage points. In contrast,
under adverse market circumstances –characterized endogenously by the 15th quan-
tile of the conditional distribution of local ES– the same shock would increase the
ES of CE-based banks in nearly 0.071 percentage points. This effect is further com-
pounded indirectly by the dynamic feedback effects caused by the network of cross-
Measuring tail-risk cross-country exposures in the banking industry
29
country exposures. Similar results hold on the remaining areas, showing that cross-
border contagion increases systematically and significantly during periods of mar-
ket distress. For instance, a one percent increase in the ES of large-scale banks in
the peripheral Euro area (formed by Portugal, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain) increases
the ES of banks in the CE area in just 0.026% in normal circumstances. However, in a
stressed scenario, the same shock increases ES in banks in the CE in 0.051%, nearly
doubling the intensity of the contagion.
Our study also reveals strong directionality in cross-border contagion. Accord-
ing to our estimates, the US banking sector is the greatest source of financial conta-
gion in the financial industry. In a stressed scenario, the largest estimates of cross-
country spillover coefficients are systematically related to this country. While previous
literature in contagion agrees that shocks that originate in the US are larger and more
persistent (Hamao et al. 1990), and that the US is a major exporter of volatility in fi-
nancial markets (Theodossiou and Lee 1993), there are specific reasons that explain
the worldwide systemic relevance of the US banking industry in our context. The
global vulnerability to the US stems from the fact that large-scale local banks with a
specific weight in their local sector are typically internationally-diversified institutions
for which, characteristically, a large portion of their foreign exposures and cross-bor-
der activities over total assets are held on US-issued financial instruments; see,
among others, Weistroffer and Möbert (2010) and Degryse et al. (2010). Hence, write-
downs can have a direct impact on the balance sheets of these banks, which are fur-
ther transmitted to other domestic banks through the local network. As a result, most
financial sectors are particularly vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks originating directly
or indirectly in the US. The evidence in our paper largely agrees with this hypothe-
sis. On the other hand, and in relative terms, the US banking system tends to show
more financial resilience against foreign shocks. When compared to European banks,
the characteristic business model in US banks is featured by a combination of low for-
eign lending to total assets ratio and low borrower concentration (Weistroffer and
Möbert 2010). As a result, US banks use local lending more intensively than Euro-
pean banks and, simultaneously, their foreign lending activities are more diversified
across different countries. While our analysis makes clear that the US banking sector is
vulnerable to shocks in European countries (particularly, the UK) as well as emerging-
market economies, this characteristic business model makes the system more resilient
in relative terms. This evidence seems particularly relevant for central banks and in-
ternational supervisors concerned with macro-prudential policies to mitigate systemic
risk, since low borrower concentration could be a determinant factor to limit the sys-
temic importance of financial institutions.
Finally, our analysis provides specific insight on the intensity of systemic tail-con-
tagion across the economic areas involved and its expected duration through the char-
acterization of the IRF of the system. During tranquil periods, local shocks cause mi-
nor or no significant impacts on the remaining areas, being quickly absorbed by local
systems. Under stressed market conditions, however, even small idiosyncratic shocks
in a particular area can trigger pronounced responses which tend to last over long pe-
riods of time in the remaining areas. Remarkably, there are meaningful differences
across the economic areas involved. For instance, particularizing in the two subgroups
of countries in the EMU area, our estimates reveal that against a one-standard-devi-
ation shock in the global system, the immediate response in expected losses of banks
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in the CE area tends to be slightly greater than that in the PE, but the adverse conse-
quences of the systemic shock tend to be much more persistent in the latter. The half-
life of the IRF, defined as the number of periods required for the IRF to dissipate the
response to a unit shock by half, is 87 days in the CE, but largely increases up to 133
days in the PE area. Shocks under adverse market conditions are extremely persis-
tent and it takes over 500 days to dissipate the effects of the shock completely.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the ex-
pectile methodology implemented to estimate ES and the 2SQR used to characterize
risk spillovers. Section 2 presents the data and discusses the main stylized features. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the estimation of the ES process on the data. Section 4 presents the
main results from the 2SQR analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
1. MEASURING TAIL INTERDEPENDENCES
We start our analysis by introducing mathematical notation and technical def-
initions. Since our modelling approach relies heavily on the expectile-based method-
ology proposed by Taylor (2008a), we first introduce this semiparametric procedure.
We then discuss the main features of the 2SQR methodology used to characterize
tail spillovers.
1.1. Estimating expected shortfall: an expectile-based approach
VaR, defined as the conditional quantile of the loss-function of a portfolio at a
certain horizon, is a fundamental tool for downside-risk measurement and risk ma -
nagement in the financial industry. However, this statistic has been widely criticized
because is not a coherent measure of risk as it is not sub-additive1. More importantly,
it is insensitive to the magnitude of extreme losses as it only accounts for their proba -
bility; see, among others, Artzner et al. (1999) and Acerbi and Tasche (2002). The
ES, proposed by Artzner et al. (1999), constitutes a valid alternative to VaR which
has gained increasing prominence.
Formally, ES is defined as the conditional expectation of the return of certain
portfolio, rt, when it exceeds the VaR threshold VaRt (λ) associated to a certain short-
fall probability λ ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
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(1) Given the returns of two financial portfolios A and B, and given certain arbitrary risk measure ρ
(·), the sub-additivity condition states axiomatically that ρ (A + B) ≤ ρ (A) + ρ (B) must hold true in
order to claim that ρ (·) is a coherent risk measure. Intuitively, the total risk of a portfolio cannot be
larger than the sum of the individual risk measures attached to its sub-portfolios. This property must
hold true in practice by virtue of the portfolio-diversification principle. Furthermore, sub- additivity
is not merely a technical requirement, but turns out to be an essential property for correct capital ad-
equacy meeting and to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a global optimum in the portfolio-op-
timization problem; see Acerbi and Tasche (2002) for a discussion.
[1]
noticing that VaRt (λ) denotes the λ-quantile of the conditional distribution of rt, i.e.,
it verifies Pr (rt ≤ VaRt (λ) |Ft–1) = λ, where Ft is the set of available information up
to time t.
The estimation of the ES process can be more demanding than VaR and typi-
cally requires explicit assumptions on the conditional distribution of the data; see Mc-
Neil et al. (2005). Taylor (2008a) introduced a procedure based on the expectile theo -
ry developed by Aigner et al. (1976) and Newey and Powell (1987) that seems well
suited for modelling ES and VaR. The distinctive characteristic of this methodology
is that it builds on estimates of the conditional dynamics of expectiles, a quantile-
related statistic that can be related to ES. The main advantage of this procedure is
that it yields estimates of the ES process without relying on a particular distribution;
see Kuan et al. (2009), and De Rossi and Harvey (2009) for related approaches.
Let {yt}, t = 1, ..., T, be a stochastic process with finite moments E (|yt|κ) for some
positive large enough κ. For ease of exposition, we assume that {yt} is a Martingale Dif-
ference Sequence (MDS) such that E (yt |Ft–1) = 0. This assumption implies no loss ofgenerality in practice, since we can consider the residuals from a demeaned process oth-
erwise, as it is customary in the literature devoted to downside-risk modelling. For cer-
tain arbitrary constant probability θ ∈ (0, 1), the population θ-expectile, mθ, can be de-
fined as the minimizer of an asymmetrically-weighted sum of squared errors, namely,
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(2) Note the similitude between expectiles mθ and quantiles, say qθ, since the latter arise as the so-
lution of the objective function minqθ ∑Tt=1 [θ|yt − qθ| I(yt ≥ qθ) + (1 − θ)|yt − qθ | I(yt < qθ)].
[2]
where I(·) denotes the indicator function2. It is easy to verify that when θ = 1/2, the
so-called Asymmetric Least-Squares (ALS) estimate of mθ reduces to the sample
mean. Therefore, in the same way in which quantiles generalize the median for θ ≠
1/2 (in the sense that the θ-quantile specifies the position below which 100 × θ% of
the probability mass of the random process Y lies), expectiles generalize the mean
for θ ≠ 1/2. In particular, the expectile function [2] determines the value point such
that 100 × θ% of the mean distance between this value and Y comes from the mass
below it; seeYao and Tong (1996). Kuan et al. (2009) provide an additional economic
interpretation for expectiles in a financial risk setting. According to these authors,
mθ can be seen as the ratio of expected margin shortfall to the expected total cost of
the capital requirement and, hence, represents the relative cost of the expected mar-
gin shortfall in the derivative contracts framework.
Expression [2] can be generalized straightforwardly to allow for time-varying
conditional dynamics, considering a measurable function, say m (xt; βθ), with xt de-
noting a k-dimensional vector of covariates and βθ a conformable vector of unknown
parameters. Setting m (xt; βθ) = x′t βθ, Newey and Powell (1987) show the consistency
and asymptotic normality under the i.i.d condition of the ALS estimator βˆθ, defined
as the solution of
[3]
with ut (b) : = yt − m (xt; b). Kuan et al. (2009) generalize this setting, permitting sta-
tionary and weakly- dependent data under suitable regularity conditions.
As pointed out by Koenker (2005), linear conditional quantile functions in a lo-
cation-scale setting imply linear conditional expectile functions, and so there is a con-
venient rescaling of the expectiles to obtain the quantiles and vice versa. The exis-
tence of a one-to-one mapping implies that the conditional θ-expectile is equivalent
to the, say, λθ -quantile, where the latter is characterized by the probability with which
observations would lie below the conditional expectile, noting that typically θ < λθ
for values in the lower tail (Efron 1991). Because any expectile is also a quantile,
conditional expectile functions can be used to estimate VaR functions given a suit-
able choice of θ that ensures the desired λ-coverage level; see, for example, Taylor
(2008a) and Kuan et al. (2009). An outstanding advantage of conditional expectile
regressions over quantile regressions is that the related loss-function, [3], is absolutely
differentiable, so computing conditional expectiles is considerably simpler in prac-
tice. More importantly, as shown by Newey and Powell (1987), the asymptotic co-
variance matrix of the parameters can be determined without estimation of the con-
ditional density function of errors.
Newey and Powell (1987) and Taylor (2008a) discuss the theoretical relation-
ship between expectiles and ES. In particular, for a MDS process, and for λθ proba -
bilities in the lower tail of the distribution, it follows that:
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[4]
where the short-hand notation mt (θ) : = m (xt; βθ) shall be conveniently used in the
sequel to simplify notation, since it is already understood that the conditional expectile
depends on unknown parameters. Hence, the ES at certain shortfall level λθ is pro-
portional to the λθ -th empirical quantile, which in turn could be estimated as the θ-th
conditional expectile. The fact that ES can be seen as a simple rescaling of a suitable
expectile is not surprising since, as pointed out by Newey and Powell (1987), mt (θ)
is determined by the properties of the expectation of the random variable Y conditional
on Y being in a tail of the distribution. Consequently, expression [4] allows us to gen-
erate estimates of the ES process without making any explicit assumption on the par-
ticular distribution of the data, only specifying the functional form that characterizes
mt (θ) as a function of (unknown) parameters. More generally, Yao and Tong (1996)
have discussed non-parametric techniques to infer this process.
In the same spirit as the class of non-linear quantile models introduced by Engle
and Manganelli (2004), Taylor (2008a) considers a non-linear autoregressive-type spec-
ification for the conditional expectile function. In this class of models, mt (θ) varies
smoothly over time and depends on the lagged values of the volatility process as prox-
ied by |yt|. For instance, the so-called Symmetric Absolute Value (SAV) model assumes
[5]
which implies that the ES process is driven by
[6]
with γ1 : = β1, and γi: = βi , i ∈ {0, 2}.
This parametric specification is strongly reminiscent of the characteristic
GARCH-type equation used to model the conditional variance of returns, widely
known because of its parsimony and superior forecasting power in practice. In fact,
if {yt} is an MDS with conditional volatility σt driven by the linear GARCH model
of Taylor (1986) (namely, σt = ω0 + ω1σt–1 + ω2 |rt–1|; ω0 > 0, ω1, ω2 ≥ 0), then both
the conditional quantile and the expectile functions are driven by SAV-type dynamics,
and so is the ES process, although the contrary is not necessarily true. Because of
the simplicity and parsimony, we shall estimate ES using [6], noting that the main
conclusions are not qualitatively different from other alternative specifications that
involve further parameters such as an asymmetric expectile-based model.
1.2. Two-stage quantile regression
Given the shortfall probability λ, let ES∗it (λ) t = 1, ..., T, i ∈ S, denote the esti-
mates of the ES process related to the banking sector in the economic area i, with S
representing a set of such areas. The superscript in ES∗it (λ) emphasizes that we build
on feasible estimates of this latent process obtained, for instance, by applying the pro-
cedures described in the previous section. Recall that our main interest is to char-
acterize the bilateral relationships that may contemporaneously arise between the tails
of the conditional distributions of the indices included in the set S.
To this end, we may run a system of linear regressions. Thus, for any i ∈ S, we
may regress ES∗it (λ) on the estimates of the remaining ES processes in S, possibly
accounting for persistence through lags of the dependent variable, and additionally
including a number of controlling variables, say (z1t, ..., zkt)′. For instance, if we as-
sume a model characterized by first-order autoregressive dynamics, our interest
would be to estimate the main parameter of the following system of equations:
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[7]
for all i ∈ S, where εit is a random error term, and the parameters δi|s would capture
the intensity of the tail spillover in portfolio i given portfolio s. Note that the analy-
sis recognizes bidirectionality in tail spillovers, since it may generally follow that δi|j
≠ δj|i, for any i, j ∈ S, i ≠ j.
In the estimation of this system, two important features should be noted. First,
the size of the cross-border risk-spillover coefficients δi|s are likely to vary depend-
ing on the underlying economic conditions. During normal or tranquil periods, tail-
interrelations may be of little or no economic importance, yet become largely signifi -
cant in periods of financial distress, particularly when dealing with portfolios related
to the banking industry; see, for instance, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Ló -
pez-Espinosa et al. (2012). More importantly, the ES processes involved in [7] are gen-
erated simultaneously, so least-squares (LS) and other standard estimation procedures
may not render consistent estimates in this context owing to endogeneity.
While a number of alternative procedures are possible, the 2SQR methodology
implemented in Adams et al. (2014) overcomes both challenges in a simple and par-
ticularly tractable way. First, the procedure builds on the quantile-regression (QR)
methodology at different quantiles τ ∈ (0, 1) of the distribution of the left-hand side
ES process in [7] to endogenously capture state-related effects on the coefficients δi|s;
see Koenker (2005) for an outstanding overview of the QR methodology3. Note that,
while the shortfall probability λ that defines the ES process is fixed in this analysis
(e.g., λ = 0.01), we can consider a sequence of quantiles {τn} that characterize the
empirical distribution of ES∗ (λ) to capture the effects of different economic scenarios
on the coefficients δi|s. Normal and tranquil periods would feature the upper tail of
the conditional distribution of ES∗it (λ), whereas low percentiles in the left tail would
be determined by the excess of volatility observed during periods of financial dis-
tress. Second, the 2SQR procedure uses the same estimating strategy as the well-
known two-stage least squares (2SLS) in order to correct the endogeneity bias. In
particular, the endogenous right-hand side variables, ES∗st (λ), are replaced with suit-
able predictions from ancillary equations based on (weakly) exogenous variables;
see, Amemiya (1982), Powell (1983), and Kim and Muller (2004).
Consequently, in the spirit of Adams et al. (2014), we shall consider the follo -
wing dynamic system of equations:
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(3) The LS methodology is useful to characterize the conditional mean of the dependent variable in
a (linear) regression given the set of regressors. When the series take values that depart from the cen-
ter of the distribution, LS-based estimates may not capture accurately the underlying relationship be-
tween the dependent variable and the regressors, leading to misleading conclusions. When the main
interest is to characterize the relationship during extreme or ‘abnormal’ periods, the quantile-regres-
sion methodology is better suited, as it is specifically intended to characterize parameters at any quan-
tile of the conditional distribution of the data.
(4) This restriction implies that lags of the dependent variable only affect the ES of the i region. In
other words, after controlling for contemporaneous spillovers from other areas, there is no additional
spillover effect in a certain area related to the lagged values of the ES in other areas.
[8]
estimating the parameters involved in these equations using the 2SQR procedure; see
Section 4 for further details. Note that the size of all parameters involved in these
equations may vary on the τ quantile that characterizes the conditional distribution
of the left-hand variables in the system. While we shall consider a broad range of
quantiles τ ∈ [0.1, 0.9], for the sake of conciseness we shall report and discuss the
results focusing on the representative quantiles τ = 0.15, τ = 0.5, and τ = 0.85. These
quantiles in the left, center, and right tail of the empirical distribution attempts to char-
acterize the local banking sector during volatile (or excited), normal (or average), and
tranquil (or low-volatile) periods, respectively.
The 2SQR methodology proceeds as follows. In the first stage, and for a fixed
value of λ, the right- hand side variables ES∗st (λ) that characterize the i-th equation
in [8], for all s ∈ S, s = i, are regressed on a set of instruments to generate predicted
values, say ES∗st
∗ (λ), which are computed as the fitted values from LS instrumen-
tal estimation. Following standard practices, we take a constant and a number of lags
from the right-hand side variables ES∗st (λ) as instruments. Note that, in order to en-
sure that the system is identified, the set of instruments does not include lags from
the left-hand side variable, ES∗it–l (λ), l ≥ 1; see Adams et al. (2014)4. In the second
stage, and for a fixed value of the τ -th percentile that captures the state of the econo -
my, the set of equations [8] are estimated individually using QR, treating the first-stage
predicted values ES∗st
∗ (λ) as regressors. Under regularity conditions, this procedure
yields consistent and asymptotically-normal distributed estimates of the main coeffi-
cients in [8]; see, for instance, Powell (1983) and Kim and Muller (2004). The estimation
of the covariance matrix in this context, however, may not be trivial, because it depends
on a number of nuisance terms that characterize both the variability of the main para-
meter estimates in the main equation as well as the parameter uncertainty stemming from
the first-stage estimation. To deal with this issue, we implement a bootstrapping scheme
based on the maximum entropy algorithm proposed in Vinod and López-de-Lacalle
(2009); see also Chevapatrakul and Paez-Farrel (2014) for related work.
2. DATA
The dataset is formed by daily continuously compounded returns from several
value-weighted indices representative of the local banking industry in different eco -
nomic regions around the world. These data are directly available from Datastream,
which originally provides closing prices denominated in US dollars. The choice of
portfolio data allows us to eliminate the idiosyncratic noise that may affect the main
conclusions in a study on individual firms. The sample comprises the period from
31/12/1999 through 07/11/2013, with 3,596 daily observations.
The banking indices are formed by the main banks which are publicly traded
in the countries integrated in the different economic areas. In turn, publicly-traded
banks are usually bank holding companies characterized by a representative size in
the local industry, sophisticated business models, and/or intense cross-border activ-
ities. All these characteristics are commonly associated to systemic importance. We
select the following indices (initial nomenclature given by Datastream in parenthe-
sis): i) US index (US-DS-Banks), formed by 33 banks in the US; ii) UK index (UK-
DS-Banks), formed by 6 banks in the UK; iii) PE index (PIIGS-DS-Banks) index,
standing for Peripheral EMU, formed by 39 banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain; iv) CE index (EMU-EX-PIIGS-DS-Banks), standing for Central EMU,
formed by 39 banks in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, and Slovenia, i.e., all the countries in the EMU area ex-
cept those included in the PE index; v) SC index (SCANDINAVIA-DS-Banks),
stan ding for Scandinavia, formed by 14 banks in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden; vi) BR index (BRIC-DS- Banks), standing for the so-called BRIC area,
formed by 45 banks in Brazil, Russia, India and China; vii) EM index (EMERGING
MARKETS-DS-Banks), formed by 288 banks operating in emerging economies.
Along with these indices, we consider a Global Banking index (WORLD-DS-Banks)
that pools data from 543 banks around the world to control for exposures to global
shocks in any of these regions. This index shall be referred to as GB in the sequel.
Appendix A provides a list with the banks included in any of these areas.
Some comments on the specific choice of these economic areas follow. The fi-
nancial sectors in the US and the UK are major international centers and dominant play-
ers worldwide and, therefore, deserve specific interest in the analysis of risk spillovers.
Together with these countries, our main interest is on the banking industry in Western
Revista de Economía Aplicada
36
Europe and, particularly, in the EMU area, owing to the systemic importance of large-
capitalization European banks worldwide. In order to ensure tractability and, mainly,
for ease of exposition of results, we consider economic areas rather than individual
countries in this analysis. The most natural division would distinguish between EMU
and non-EMU countries, since the former defines a common economic area formed
by different countries with the same currency. Within the EMU, furthermore, it seems
appropriate to distinguish between countries whose financial industries proved
fairly sensitive structurally to shocks in the earlier stages of the financial crisis. There-
fore, in the same spirit as related studies [e.g., Ludwig and Sobański (2014);
Ballester et al. (2014)], such distinction is characterized in our study attending to the
PE and CE classification, noting that the related indices are directly provided by
Datastream5. This separation allows us to address heterogeneous responses in cross-
country vulnerabilities within the EMU and characterize differences in the way in
which systemic shocks are propagated6. Together with the two EMU subareas, we
consider an index formed by Scandinavian banks, SC, and an index of banks in emerg-
ing economies that undergone remarkably strong development over the recent years,
BR7. More generally, and focusing exclusively on emerging economies, we can con-
sider a broader index that includes a fully diversified portfolio of emerging economies,
namely, the EM index. Finally, it should be noted that the sample is not meant to ex-
haustively cover all possible economic areas (e.g., individual countries such as Japan,
Canada, or Switzerland have not been included in the analysis) owing to considera-
tions related to parsimonious modelling in the equation system and, mainly, for ease
of exposition and discussion of results. An analysis dealing with individual countries
only, seeking to obtain a more refined picture based on country-specific vulnerabil-
ities, may constitute an interesting topic for future research.
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(5) The PE area has attracted considerable attention from both public authorities, economic media,
and market investors (currency traders and global investors) that found it convenient to group these
countries together, motivating, among others, a specific index in Datastream. Countries in the PE have
been traditionally characterized by weaker macroeconomic indicators and greater political instabil-
ity in relation to other countries in the EMU. More importantly for the purpose of this paper, their fi-
nancial sectors have suffered in a greater extense the adverse consequences of the global recession
and the European Sovereign debt crisis. On May 10, 2010, the EU approved a 750 billion euro sta-
bilization package to support these countries.
(6) Whereas PE-CE division seems to be meaningful enough for the purpose of this paper, some read-
ers may find that the financial sectors of small economies, such as Cyprus, Malta or Slovenia, may
perhaps fit better in the PE group. We remark, nevertheless, that the banking indices analyzed in this
paper are constructed by value-weighting the returns of the individual banks. Hence, it is the large-
capitalization banks included in each of the representative areas which ultimately define the time- se-
ries dynamics of the resultant index. As result, including medium-sized banks that operate in Malta,
Cyprus or Slovenia in the CE group or not is unlikely to lead to major differences. For instance, in
the CE group, the bank with the largest average market capitalization over the period 2010-2014, is
BNP, valued in USD 74,350 million. The largest bank in Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia is the Bank of
Cyprus, with an average capitalization of USD 1,620 millions.
(7) The SC index includes Finland, a country belonging to the CE area. Nevertheless, this country
contributes with just two banks to the total index. Because of the little representativity of this coun-
try, and because of the value-weighted design of the sample, it is unlikely that having this country in
both SC and CE areas causes any significant form of distortion in the main conclusions. We checked
this point by excluding SC in a first analysis (see Section 4.1), noting no qualitative difference in the
main conclusions with respect to a more general analysis including this area (see Section 4.2).
Table 1 reports the usual descriptive statistics on the returns of all these indices over
the total sample and given the pre-crisis and crisis period subsamples, namely, 1999-2006
and 2007-2013. Returns exhibit the usual stylized features at the daily frequency, such as
skewness and excess kurtosis. Returns in the banking industry of the US and EMU areas
are characterized by large levels of volatility –mainly, in the second half of the sample–
and low average returns. The annualized mean return over the total period is approximately
zero in the US (0.09%), and negative in the CE (-3.50%) and the UK (-4.02%). Consis-
tent with the division of the EMU area into PE and CE regions, it is immediately clear
that the banks in the countries belonging to the PE area suffered the consequences of
the crises more intensely than any other area in our sample. The PE index exhibits the
lowest mean annualized return (-5.04%) over the total period. On the other hand, banks
in emerging countries have shown more resilience to the global financial recession
and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. The returns in emerging countries
over the period are characterized by lower volatility levels and higher mean returns8.
3. ESTIMATING EXPECTED SHORTFALL
To characterize the dynamics of the ES process, we set λ = 0.01, the regulatory
shortfall probability level required by Basel disposals and the most common choice
in downside-risk analysis. The daily frequency is consistent with the holding period
targeted for internal risk control by most financial firms; see, among others, Taylor
(2008b). Consistent with standard procedures in downside-risk analysis, we compute
ES on demeaned r~it, determined as the residuals from a first-order autoregression;
see, for instance, Poon and Granger (2003). The ES processes are then estimated in-
dividually for any of the economic areas using the expectile- based model discussed
in the previous section. In particular, given λ = 0.01, the latent conditional expec-
tile in the i-th area is assumed to obey time-varying dynamics given by mit (θ) = βi0
+ βi1 mit–1 (θ) + βi2|r~it–1|, t = 1, ..., T. In the same spirit as Engle and Manganelli (2004),
we initialize mi0 (θ) in the i-th economic area to the empirical θi-expectile based on
the first 300 observations in the sample for each series. Giving θi, the unknown pa-
rameters (βi0, βi1, βi2)′ that characterize the time-varying dynamics of ES are deter-
mined as the numerical solution of the ALS problem [3]. More specifically, following
Efron (1991) and Taylor (2008a), θˆi is optimally determined as the value for which
the proportion of in-sample observations lying below the conditional expectile, say
λˆi,T (θ), matches the shortfall probability λ = 0.01. To this end, we estimated the
model for different values of this parameter using the optimization procedure de-
scribed in Engle and Manganelli (2004) and Taylor (2008a) in a trial-and-error al-
gorithm with stopping rule |λ − λˆi,T (θ)| < 10−06 9. Note, therefore, that the estimates
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(8) Some caution should be applied when comparing the mean-variance profile across these areas be-
cause of the influence of cross-country diversification. Whereas the US- and UK-related ones are coun-
try specific indices, the other series represent the banking industries in different countries, which in-
troduces a certain level of diversification.
(9) We randomly generate 1,000 parameter vectors in order to evaluate the ALS loss-function. The
ten vectors that produced the lowest values were then used as initial values in a Quasi-Newton algo-
rithm. The estimates from the vector producing the lowest value in the loss-function is to be chosen
as the final parameter vector.
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Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DAILY RETURNS OF REPRESENTATIVE INDICES
OF THE LOCAL BANKING-INDUSTRY IN DIFFERENT ECONOMIC REGIONS
Region Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skew. Kurt.
Panel A. All sample
US 0.0960 0.9463 32.4195 -0.1774 0.1602 0.0903 17.1664
BR 12.1923 25.9466 26.7714 -0.1062 0.1434 0.0154 9.7893
PE -5.0453 4.4639 31.2875 -0.1061 0.1860 0.1738 10.0923
CE -3.5099 12.0845 34.2854 -0.1338 0.1641 0.0716 9.9634
UK -4.0268 12.0845 33.8417 -0.2161 0.1954 -0.1537 16.0296
SC 7.1017 4.6113 32.2620 -0.1462 0.1489 0.1792 10.6774
EM 8.2132 25.4218 20.4843 -0.0928 0.1130 -0.3839 10.9448
GB 0.9145 16.3191 20.5831 -0.0865 0.1244 -0.0792 16.0296
Panel B. Subsample 2000-2006
US 7.1483 4.5424 21.3367 -0.0699 0.0839 0.1681 7.0796
BR 24.5373 35.7655 23.6549 -0.0640 0.1028 -0.1093 5.7595
PE 8.1175 13.2878 18.0595 -0.0591 0.0662 -0.0762 5.3710
CE 7.8650 16.0453 21.5742 -0.0773 0.0754 -0.1699 7.2734
UK 5.9250 2.9155 22.8570 -0.0941 0.0760 -0.0651 6.7155
SC 15.8207 10.8853 20.8107 -0.0781 0.0788 -0.0939 6.5990
EM 13.4543 29.3442 15.2587 -0.0552 0.0378 -0.6735 5.7827
GB 7.4541 19.0974 14.2393 -0.0416 0.0556 -0.0233 6.7155
Panel C. Subsample 2007-2013
US -6.4903 0.9389 40.5792 -0.1774 0.1602 0.0907 13.4518
BR 2.4667 24.7716 29.5535 -0.1062 0.1434 0.1014 10.8333
PE -16.3859 2.7895 40.3798 -0.1061 0.1860 0.2168 7.0776
CE -13.5756 5.1843 43.4144 -0.1338 0.1641 0.1279 7.3172
UK -12.8978 -0.2345 42.0430 -0.2161 0.1954 -0.1188 12.8677
SC -0.4828 0.3949 40.6002 -0.1462 0.1489 0.2187 8.0713
EM 3.8756 28.6903 24.6244 -0.0928 0.1130 -0.2610 9.6276
GB -5.2174 16.4311 25.3843 -0.0865 0.1244 -0.0482 12.8677
This table shows the main descriptive statistics for bank portfolio daily returns in the set of regions
considered: US (United States), BR (BRICs), PE (Peripheral EMU), CE (Central EMU), UK (Uni-
ted Kingdom), SC (Scandinavia), EM (Emerging Markets), GB (Global Banking). Mean, median
and standard deviation are computed by annualizing return data. Minimum, maximum, skewness,
kurtosis and sample size are computed from daily return data. Panel A presents the descriptives for
all sample, Panel B depicts the results from 2000 to 2006 and Panel C shows the main statistics
from 2007 to 2013.
Source: Own elaboration.
of the parameter vector ζi = (βi0, βi1, βi2; θi)′ are determined simultaneously in this
context through a recursive algorithm, and the values ensure that the empirical cov-
erage probability is approximately 0.01 in each area.
Table 2 reports the ALS estimates for the different economic areas analyzed.
Sin ce the latent ES is a volatility-related process, the estimates of the ES are
strongly persistent, with the autoregressive coefficient β1 : = γ1 ranging from 0.69
(UK) to nearly 0.90 (PE). Similarly, absolute-valued returns, the most common proxy
of volatility in practice, have a strong influence on ES10. On average, the value of
the optimal expectile θi is 0.002, which as expected, is smaller than the target quan-
tile, λ = 0.01. Table 2 also reports the p- values of several test statistics which are
implemented to backtest VaR-type forecasts. Since expectiles can be used to estimate
VaR, as discussed previously, we can analyze if the resultant estimates provide a rea-
sonable fitting to the data using backtesting procedures on the in-sample estimates
mˆ t (θi), t = 1, ..., T. More specifically, we implement the unconditional coverage test
by Kupiec (1995) and the conditional coverage test by Christoffersen (1998). The
Kupiec test requires the empirical coverage λˆ to be close enough to the nominal level
λ = 0.01. Since the value of θ for each series is chosen under the condition that λˆi,T
(θ) must match λ, correct unconditional coverage is trivially ensured in our analy-
sis. The conditional test by Christoffersen (1998) address simultaneously the hy-
potheses of correct unconditional coverage and first-order independence in the se-
quence of VaR exceptions. Table 2 shows massive p-values associated to both test
statistics, thereby supporting the empirical suitability of the model.
On the other hand, Christoffersen’s (1998) backtests have been criticize because
are known to exhibit low power, particularly, when analyzing serial independence.
This observation is important in our context because whereas unconditional cover-
age is ensured by construction, there is no guarantee that expectile-based VaR ex-
ceptions behave as a MDS. In order to ensure that the results reported previously are
not spurious, Table 2 also reports the p-values of the duration-based test proposed
by Berkowitz et al. (2011). This procedure uses a likelihood-ratio test to address the
null hypothesis that VaR exceptions behave as MDS by analyzing the duration be-
tween consecutive exceptions. Christoffersen and Pelletier (2004) argue that, in the
context of VaR modelling, duration-based tests are generally better indicated that
other alternatives, such as the density-forecast test proposed by Ber kowitz (2001).
Indeed, the experimental analysis in Berkowitz et al. (2011) show that the duration-
based test exhibits considerably enhanced statistical properties. According to Table 2,
the evidence based on the duration test fully agrees with the evi dence in Christof-
fersen’s (1998) backtests and supporting the hypothesis that expectile-based excep -
tions behave as MDS, thereby ensuring correct conditional co verage. The main con-
clusion from the backtesting analysis, therefore, suggest that expectiles do not
generate unreliable estimates for downside risk modelling; see also Taylor (2008a)11.
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(10) Note that the estimates of β2 in the expectile-related equation (and, hence, γ2 in the ES-related equa-
tion) are negative, reflecting that higher levels of volatility give rise to a greater ES. While it is customary
to report both VaR and ES in absolute levels (as it is understood that they refer to losses), we respect the
negative sign that characterizes both downside-risk measures according to the definitions in Section 1.
(11) We obtain similar conclusions using alternative ES models such asymmetric expectile-based
model and different parametric specifications based on GARCH model volatility estimates.
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Table 3 reports the usual descriptive statistics for the estimates of the expectile-
based ES processes as well as the sample correlation between these series. The daily
average ranges from -3.37%, for the Global Banking index GB, to -6.24%, in UK, the
country with the lowest daily return in the sample. These series show a considerable
degree of dispersion, with a minimum value that, for instance, reached -38.57% in the
UK in March 2009. The analysis on sample correlations shows that extreme expected
losses in the banking industry are largely correlated across differ ent countries and
economic areas, with correlations ranging from 52% (for the pair PE and BR) to 93%
(for the pair SC and GB). This evidence suggests a considerable degree of commo -
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Table 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR THE ESTIMATES
OF THE EXPECTILE-BASED EXPECTED SHORTFALL PROCESSES
FROM EQUATION [6] FOR THE SET OF ANALYZED REGIONS
Region Mean Median Std. Min. Max. Skew. Kurt.
Panel A. ES Descriptive Statistics
US -0.0537 -0.0423 0.0377 -0.2563 -0.0155 -2.5469 10.5655
BR -0.0462 -0.0429 0.0159 -0.1931 -0.0250 -3.6073 23.3516
PE -0.0517 -0.0439 0.0245 -0.1804 -0.0198 -1.4161 5.2391
CE -0.0544 -0.0455 0.0279 -0.1997 -0.0211 -1.8280 6.8485
UK -0.0624 -0.0520 0.0382 -0.3857 -0.0178 -2.8131 14.9801
SC -0.0533 -0.0440 0.0282 -0.1972 -0.0219 -2.2824 8.9210
EM -0.0384 -0.0344 0.0151 -0.1802 -0.0197 -3.5055 22.7557
GB -0.0337 -0.0296 0.0163 -0.1353 -0.0161 -2.4042 14.9801
Panel B. ES Correlations
Region US BR PE CE UK SC EM GB
US 1.00
BR 0.65 1.00
PE 0.66 0.52 1.00
CE 0.77 0.64 0.91 1.00
UK 0.82 0.65 0.71 0.82 1.00
SC 0.85 0.67 0.84 0.91 0.83 1.00
EM 0.70 0.87 0.62 0.72 0.71 0.76 1.00
GB 0.91 0.77 0.80 0.90 0.86 0.93 0.83 1.00
Panel A presents the main descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, mini-
mum, skewness and kurtosis) of the Expected Shortfall processes at the shortfall probability λ = 0.01
for the daily demeaned returns banks portfolios corresponding to the whole set of regions conside-
red. Panel B shows the cross correlations between the Expected Shortfall estimations.
Source: Own elaboration.
nality and the existence of global trends or common factors that propitiate systemic
risk in the banking industry12.
Finally, Figure 1 shows the time-series of (demeaned) returns and the expecti -
le-based estimates of the ES for each economic area in the sample. As expected, ES
exhibit persistent time-varying dynamics characterized by massive bursts of volatil-
ity which are directly related to the events that characterized a backdrop of extreme
volatility associated to the episodes of crises in the sample.
4. RISK SPILLOVERS IN THE GLOBAL BANKING INDUSTRY: 2SQR ESTIMATION
We now discuss the main results from 2SQR estimation. In the implementation
of this methodology, we follow Adams et al. (2014) and estimate equation system (8)
controlling for variables that may systematically affect the left-hand side variables. Be-
cause the banking industry is vulnerable to global trends, as discussed previously, we
use the ES of the global banking index GB to capture the exposure of banks in domestic
areas to this class of shocks. This ensures that the spillover coefficients δi|s that relates
bank losses in two economic areas can be interpreted in a causal way, as they charac-
terize vis-à-vis the cross-border transmission of downside risk once global-related ef-
fects are controlled for13. Furthermore, the inclusion of a global variable allows us to
circumvent potential concerns related to neglected variables associated to economic
areas or individual countries which are not explicitly acknowledged in this analysis.
We carry out two different analysis that only differ in the sets of economic re-
gions analyzed. We firstly address tail interdependences among the banks belonging
to US, PE, CE, and EM areas, i.e., considering the set SB = {US, CE, PE, EM}. This
analysis focuses on a set formed by a reduced number of economic areas, which nev-
ertheless comprises some of the major areas of global economic relevance, and, as
such, has received considerable attention in the literature. The reduced number of
areas involved in the equation system allows to present and discuss results in a con-
cise way. In addition, we focus on an extended set which includes all the economic
regions considered in this paper, namely, SE = {SB, UK, SC, BR}. The analysis on
the extended set SE not only provides a broader picture of systemic interrelations and
tail-contagion, but also allows us to address empirically whether the initial conclu-
sions are generally sensitive to the omission of potentially economic regions or not.
4.1. Basic equation system
4.1.1. Main results
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates from equation system [8] given the set of
countries SB = {US, CE, PE, EM}, the shortfall probability λ = 0.01, and the repre-
Measuring tail-risk cross-country exposures in the banking industry
43
(12) Several papers have exploited commonality to characterize systemic risk. For instance, Ro-
dríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013), who use the first principal component in CDS spreads to measure
systemic risk. Ballester et al. (2014) also gather the commonality using PC analysis.
(13) In the literature of financial contagion, it is usual to distinguish between shock transmission through
common channels, which affect multiple countries at the same time (e.g., through blanket withdrawals
by common lenders), or through country-specific channels, which depend on variables that characterize
country-specific financial and trade linkages. Our modelling approach implicitly captures both channels.
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sentative quantiles τ ∈ {0.15, 0.50, 0.85}. In the estimation of the dynamic equation
system, we allow the global banking index GB to have feedback effects with the areas
in SB, i.e., the full system is estimated with 5 equations. Our main interest is on discussing
the estimated values of the coefficients ξi (τ) and, mainly, δi|s (τ) from these equations.
Recall that ξi (τ) captures the exposure of the domestic banking system to systematic
shocks in the global financial system while, more importantly for the purpose of this
paper, δi|s (τ) captures the contemporaneous response in the ES of the banking system
in area i against a one percent change in the ES of the banking system in area s, for all
i, s ∈ SB14. Statistical significance at the usual confidence levels is determined on the
basis of maximum entropy bootstrap of Vinod and López-de-Lacalle (2009).
A) Sensitivity to global shocks
We start our discussion by focusing on the results from the estimation of ξi (τ). We
first focus our attention on the estimates based on the normal scenario, characterized
by the quantile τ = 0.5. During normal periods, the estimates of ξi (τ) are positive and
significant for all the areas included in SB. This result shows that the conditional me-
dian of expected losses in the banking industry is driven by a global component,
which essentially agrees with the correlation analysis discussed previously (see Table 3),
and the empirical evidence put forward in previous studies; see, for instance, Ro-
dríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013). According to these estimates, a one percent shock
in the ES in the global system during normal conditions will increase the average
ES of banks in PE and CE by 0.036% and 0.017%, respectively. Remarkably, the ex-
posure to global shocks under normal market conditions tends to be smaller for eco-
nomic areas with better overall macroeconomic fundamental (US and CE), while
economies which traditionally have had greater inflation ratios and higher unem-
ployment rates (PE and EM) prove more vulnerable to systemic shocks.
Remarkably, the picture that emerges under the two extreme scenarios in the tails
is completely different. During tranquil periods (τ = 0.85), the estimates of the slope
coefficient ξi (τ) are not significant in any of the areas, except in the US15. Conse-
quently, the small bank losses that typically occur during calm periods tend to mostly
obey idiosyncratic patterns which, in general, are not related to other areas. In sharp
contrast, during periods of financial distress (τ = 0.15) the local vulnerability to global
systematic shocks largely increases and becomes highly significant in all the areas an-
alyzed. Note, for instance, that the sample average of the ratio ξˆ(0.15) / ξˆ(0.5) is 4.15,
and that this ratio is particularly sizeable in the CE area, with a value of 7.46. Ac-
cording to Table 4, banks in the Eurozone (both in PE and CE areas) are more vul-
nerable to global shocks under a stressed scenario than banks in any other area. This
general pattern is fully evident in Figure 2, which shows the shapes of the estimated
coefficient functions ξˆi (τ), i ∈ SB, as a function of the quantiles τ ∈ [0.10, 0.90].
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(14) As a robustness check, we alternatively estimated the system considering VaR measures, gen-
erated from GARCH-type models, as in Adams et al. (2014). The qualitative evidence of contagion
was similar to the one based on ES; See Appendix B for details.
(15) The coefficient remains positive and significant at the 95% confidence level. In contrast to other
countries, the US shows significant links to the global system even during calm periods. This evidence
is probably related to the importance and relative weight of the US banking system in the global fi-
nancial system.
The lack of a common regulatory setting and a banking supervisory system, as
well as the absence of effective instruments to handle the consequences of a systemic
crisis (e.g., the collapse of large-scale banks), have been pointed out as major weak-
nesses of the European financial industry. It was not until June 2012 when EU au-
thorities committed to making decisive steps towards creating an effective Banking
Union, adopting measures that, among others, will lead to the implementation of a
single supervisory mechanism and a common bank resolution program. The em-
pirical evidence shown by our analysis, clearly agrees with these concerns and jus-
tifies the need of a new regulatory setting to strengthen the resilience of the area.
For completeness in our analysis, we also discuss the estimates of the autore-
gressive coefficient, ϕi (τ), in this subsection. Such estimates lie in the neighborhood
of unit for all the quantiles analyzed. This is expected because, as shown in the pre-
vious section (see Table 2), ES is a persistent process. Consistent with the evidence
reported by Adams et al. (2014), the estimates of this coefficient are strictly smaller
than unit during tranquil and normal periods, characterizing mean-reverting paths, and
tend to be slightly greater than one during periods of distress, suggesting non-linear
or mildly explosive patterns. Although explosive patterns are often related to model
misspecification, in our view this evidence is not particularly surprising in the con-
text of the current paper. The dynamics of the 1% ES process during the more
volatile days that characterize lower quantiles are distinctively driven by the largest
outliers in the sample. An autoregressive coefficient equal to or greater than one is
the only way in which an autoregressive process can accommodate the non-linear pat-
terns which are usually associated with large volatility bursts that cause extreme mar-
ket movements.
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Figure 2: ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FUNCTIONS ξi(τ) FROM SYSTEM [8]
FOR A RANGE VALUE OF QUANTILES τ ∈ [0.1,0.9]. THE GRAPH SHOWS
THE INFLUENCE OF THE GLOBAL INDEX ON THE REMAINING AREAS
Source: Own elaboration.
B) Cross-border tail-contagion
We now turn our attention to the coefficients δi|s that characterize cross-border
tail contagion between different economic areas. Consistent with the hypothesis that
the conditional tails of financial returns are prone to comove, the estimates δˆi|s are
mostly positive and highly significant in all the cases, particularly, in the excited state.
With regard to global shocks, the size of cross-country spillovers are characterized
by state-dependencies that lead to a great deal of variability as a function of τ. In par-
ticular, that cross- country spillovers are greater during periods of distress, but tend
to weaken and eventually vanish during calm periods. This general pattern is fully
evident in Figure 3, which shows the shapes of the estimated coefficient functions
δˆi|s(τ) for τ ∈ [0.10, 0.90]. This graph and the estimates of Table 4 make clear that
the severity of financial contagions under adverse conditions can be largely under-
estimated under normal market circumstances. Consequently, and as noted in Adams
et al. (2014), standard analysis that merely focus on the conditional mean or the me-
dian analysis may lead to potentially misleading conclusions.
We now discuss in detail the estimates of the cross-border spillovers in the dif-
ferent banking systems as a response to a shock in a certain economic area, reported
by columns (second to sixth) in Table 4, throughout the following subsections. For
ease of exposition, we comment on the results in the most relevant context charac-
terized by stressed conditions (τ = 0.15).
B.1) Sensitivity of domestic banks to shocks in the US
Under stressed conditions, all the regions –including the global financial sec-
tor– become particularly sensitive to shocks in the US banking system. In particu-
lar, during periods of local stress, a one percent increase in the ES of US banks di-
rectly increases the local ES by 0.072% (CE), 0.047% (PE), and 0.043% (EM); see
Table 4, second column. US banks are the main contributors to the ES of the global
financial system under stressed conditions, noting that a one percent increment in
the expected losses of US bank increases the ES of the global financial system by
0.041%. The idiosyncratic shocks originated in this country are further amplified in-
directly through the feedback effects caused by the network of cross-border expo-
sures. For instance, every percentage point increase in the ES of the global system
caused by the shock in the US is further transmitted into the local banking areas (in-
cluding the US) with an intensity which ranges from 0.070% in emerging markets,
to 0.127% in the CE. Consequently, and according to the 2SQR estimates, the US
banking system is the most important source of financial contagion in the sample con-
sidered. Idiosyncratic shocks originated in this country can affect all the other
banking systems (particularly, those in European countries) under stressed conditions.
The main reason for the global systemic importance of the US is that, when con-
sidering the international network of global cross-border exposures, the US banking
system has a central and predominant position, since the remaining countries typi cally
hold large portions of US-issued financial assets, particularly, European countries. For
instance, according to the statistics elaborated by Degryse et al. (2010) on annual data
from Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Consolidated Banking statistics on re-
porting countries in the period 1996-2006, the bank credits to the US represent, on
average, 25%, 28%, and 30% of the total foreign credits held by Germany, France,
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and Netherlands on reporting countries, respectively. The same ratio ranges from 10%
(Ireland) to 16% (Italy) in the PE area, showing a smaller exposition to the US. Eu-
ropean banks kept large holdings of illiquid US dollar assets which were financed with
short-term wholesale funding and heavy reliance on cross-currency swaps; see
McGuire and Von Peter (2009). When the market value of these claims collapsed as
a consequence of the subprime crisis, European banks suffered massive losses, which
were further amplified when the interbank and swap markets became impaired in
2008; see Acharya and Schnabl (2010). The estimates in our analysis successfully cap-
ture the sensitivity of EMU banks to the US and, furthermore, identify a greater sen-
sitivity in the Central EMU area, characterized by a greater reliance on US lending.
B.2) Sensitivity of domestic banks to shocks in the EMU: PE and CE subareas
The analysis of the spillover coefficients related to the PE banking system shows
that the shocks originated in this area –mainly associated to the European sovereign
debt crisis– essentially had a more local nature than those originated in the early stages
of US subprime crisis; see Table 4, third column. The system with the largest vul-
nerability to shocks in the PE area is the one formed by the remaining banks in the
EMU area. This is not surprising, because the main economies in CE, such as Ger-
many, France or Holland, keep large holdings of debt issued by European peripheral
countries. Note, in Figure 3, that the vulnerability of CE to PE is highly significant
for a large range of percentiles τ but, once more, the interdependence seems stronger
in the low quantiles that characterized stressed conditions. In particular, for τ = 0.15,
the average response of expected losses of CE banks against a one percent shock in
the ES of PE is 0.051%. This result agrees with the empirical evidence discussed by
Ludwig and Sobański (2014), who on the basis of a different methodology, find that
the PE area (called GIIPS in that paper) was the epicenter of risk spillovers during
the crisis years 2007-2010. In contrast, banks in the US and emerging-market eco -
nomies exhibit weaker exposures to this area. For instance, the spillover coefficient
of US on PE is only 0.017. Although this coefficient is statistically significant, it seems
of little economic relevance. In a similar vein, the exposure of the global banking sys-
tem to the PE area is not significant. This evidence suggests that idiosyncratic shocks
originating as a consequence of the European sovereign debt crisis in peripheral Eu-
rope did not affect the remaining banking systems systematically.
On the other hand, the systemic exposures of international banks to banks in the
CE area are much more important and largely significant in all cases; see Table 4,
fourth column. Among the different economic areas considered, the US banking sec-
tor, with a tail spillover coefficient of 0.061, is the most vulnerable country to shocks
originating in the CE. This sensitivity is nearly twice as big as that in the remaining
areas. The reason underlying the vulnerability of US banks to CE banks relative to
PE banks can be related to the existence of strong bilateral borrowing activities be-
tween these areas. According to Degryse et al. (2010), the aggregate claims on the
reporting countries in the CE area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and
Netherlands) represent around 34% of the total foreign claims held by US. Among
these countries, Germany is the largest borrower, representing 17% of the foreign
bank credits issued by the US. In contrast, Italy, Portugal and Spain together repre-
sent 6% of foreign claims in the US system. Note that although the direct exposure
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of US to PE is relatively moderate (the estimated spillover coefficient is 0.017), as
discussed previously, the network of cross-border interconnections within the EMU
defines a powerful indirect channel of contagion through the CE such that idiosyn-
cratic shocks originated in peripheral EMU countries could spread to CE and, from
here, to other economic areas, particularly, the US. Finally, it is interesting to note
that, after the US, the CE is the second largest contributor to the ES of global risk
under volatile conditions, since the sensibility of GB to CE is 0.0379%.
B.3) Sensitivity of domestic banks to shocks in EM
Finally, the 2SQR estimates reveal that, under adverse market conditions, the
banking sectors in the both the US and the Eurozone are sensitive to shocks in emerg-
ing-market economies. Over the last decades, emerging economies have evolved
from being peripheral players to become systemically important trade and financial cen-
ters (IMF, 2011a). Financial linkages between advanced and emerging economies are
now stronger and as a result advanced economies are more exposed to the latter group.
In the years preceding the global recession, the bigger banks of these areas increased
their participation in emerging markets through local affiliates, which resulted in in-
creased networks of bilateral exposures; see Tressel (2010). Financial exposures to
emerging markets are mainly concentrated in foreign bank claims (IMF, 2014). According
to our analysis, the exposure to emerging-market risk spillovers varies in importance
across the three different regions analyzed, with the US being the banking sector with
the largest vulnerability. The size of the US spillover coefficient at τ = 0.15 is 0.065,
which nearly doubles the size of the two EMU countries. The importance of the EM
spillover coefficient is fully evident in Figure 3, showing that δˆUS|EM largely increases
for lower values τ. For instance, whereas δˆUS|EM is close to zero for values of τ greater
than 0.30, it takes sizeable values that reach δˆUS|EM = 0.11 at the quantile τ = 0.1.
The relative sensitivity of the US economy to emerging-country economies po -
ses a serious threat that has been recently outlined by an International Monetary Fund
report. This report estimates that a current drop of one percentage point in emerg-
ing-market GDP could hit US GDP by around a fifth of a percentage point; see IMF
(2014). This estimate is, nevertheless, conservative, as it does not account for direct
financial spillovers through the financial sector. As their own report remarks, if risk
premiums react further to the growth shock –due to balance-sheet exposures of fi-
nancial intermediaries– financial channels would come into play and the size of the
spillover in the real economy could be larger. Indeed, the analysis in this paper re-
veals the existence of financial channels that can introduce contagion in advanced
economies from shocks in emerging economies under adverse market conditions.
4.1.2. Expected duration of risk spillovers
Given the estimates of the equation system [8], we can characterize the expected
duration of a shock through the Impulse Response Function (IRF) analysis. We adopt
the same identification strategy as Adams et al. (2014), i.e., orthogonalizing IRF us-
ing the standard Cholesky decomposition, and ordering the shock transmitting vari-
able last, since there is no theoretical guidance for a priori ordering. Note that this
implies that a shock on the ES of certain region at time t will only affect this region
at that time, spreading to the remaining areas in the following periods. Although this
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approach may lead to conservative IRF (which, consequently, can be regarded as the
smallest estimated response given a shock), the main benefit is that it is not necessa -
ry to impose a potentially ad-hoc ordering because all economies are treated equally;
see Adams et al. (2014) for details. As usual in this literature, we assume a unit shock
of one standard deviation.
Figure 4 depicts the time-profile of the IRFs, characterizing the reaction of the
domestic banking sector in each economic region in SB against a unit shock in the ES
of the global financial system. We consider tranquil, normal, and volatile market con-
ditions. In this context, the size the immediate response depends on the spillover co-
efficients ξi (τ), whereas the persistence that characterizes the IRF depends on both
ξi (τ) and ϕi (τ). As expected from the previous analysis, the IRF characterize het-
erogeneous responses across the economic regimes. In particular, during tranquil pe-
riods, a systematic shock in the global financial industry tends to cause minor or no
significant impact in the domestic areas, being quickly absorbed by the local systems.
Under normal market conditions, however, systematic shocks trigger a more pro-
nounced response in the local areas which, furthermore, tend to last over a consider-
ably larger period of time. On average, a one-standard-deviation shock in the global
system increases the domestic ES in absolute terms in an amount which ranges from
9.27% (US) to 12.81% (CE) of the size of the shock. The half-life of the IRF, defined
as the number of periods required for the IRF to dissipate the response to a unit shock
by half, ranges from 45 days (PE) to 130 days (EM). Nevertheless, the IRFs are
strongly persistent, and it takes around 400 days to dissipate completely the effect of
the shock16. While the shock seems to cause a greater impact on CE, the overall re-
sponse under normal circumstances is very similar in all the areas analyzed.
In a stressed scenario, the overall reaction against systematic shocks in the global
banking industry is more pronounced. Furthermore, the differences across eco-
nomic areas are now much more evident. In particular, the most vulnerable area to
systematic shocks is the Eurozone. The peaks of the IRFs in CE and PE lead to
spillovers of about 20.91% and 16.64% of the size of the global shock. These rep-
resent substantial increments in the size of the spillover with respect to the normal
scenario, particularly, in the CE area, although we stress that estimates should be re-
garded as potentially conservative in our approach. Interestingly, while the imme-
diate response to a global shock is greater in CE, the IRF of PE decays at a slower
rate, suggesting that the effects of a systematic shock in that area tend to remain sig-
nificant over an extended period. Indeed, the half-life in the CE and PE areas is 87
and 133 days, respectively. On the other hand, systematic shocks cause a more mod-
erate response in emerging-market economies, and particularly in US, for which the
peak of the IRF is located at 9.32% the size of the unit shock. Clearly, the IRF of
the US is dominated by the remaining IRFs, suggesting that, broadly speaking, the
US banking system has a stronger resilience to global shocks. This empirical evi-
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(16) We are not aware of any other paper characterizing the IRF of the expected shortfall process. How-
ever, previous literature has characterized IRF to address volatility spillovers in different markets. The
papers dealing with contagion in financial and commodity market show strongly persistent IRFs in
which it takes considerable time (between two and four years of trading days) for volatility to revert
completely after a large shock; see, for instance, Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2009) and Jin et al. (2012).
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dence essentially agrees with the simulation-based results shown in Degryse et al.
(2010). This paper provides further evidence using a formal econometric approach.
Figures 5 to 7 show the IRFs that characterize the response of banks in each eco-
nomic region in SB against an (idiosyncratic) unit shock in each of the remaining areas
under the three economic scenarios analyzed. In the stressed scenario, the long-term per-
sistence of a shock would be characterized by explosive patterns (see Table 4), imply-
ing that ES becomes more and more negative in the long-term. In practice, however,
the extreme outliers that give rise to non-linearities and bursts of volatility in low
quantiles only occur during very short periods of time. Consequently, we adopt the
same approach as Adams et al. (2014), and assume that, although a shock occurs un-
der stressed conditions (which characterize the size of the spillovers at the time of
the shock), long-term persistence is better characterized by the estimates under the
normal state. We, therefore, assume in the characterization of the IRF that the mar-
ket returns to normal state coefficients after the day of the shock.
The main picture that emerges under country-specific idiosyncratic shocks is
completely similar to that discussed under systematic shocks, showing large differen -
ces in both the intensity and the duration of contagion across the different economic
scenarios. In particular, foreign shocks trigger a larger cross-country response in the
expected losses of local banks in a stressed scenario in the domestic economy. For
ease of exposition, we briefly discuss the main results for this scenario, as it poses the
most relevant case. The largest response against a country-specific idiosyncratic
shock is triggered by the US, which causes the ES of CE banks to increase in absolute
terms about 20.9% the size of the standard shock. The half-life of the spillover in this
area is 93 days. Nevertheless, the IRF exhibits a considerable persistence character-
ized by a low-decay to zero, and it takes over 500 days to completely remove the ef-
fects of the shock. In addition, the CE banking area is very sensitive to idiosyn cratic
shocks originating in the PE area. A unit shock in peripheral EMU countries leads the
ES of banks in the remaining EMU countries to increase the size of this shock by about
14.75% as a consequence of cross-border contagion. Persistence, as measured by the
half-life, is 107 days. Shocks initiated in the PE area trigger a smaller response in the
US (11.78%) with a shorter half-life (97 days). According to these estimates, the US
is more sensitive to the other regions, since shocks in the CE and EM area increase
the ES in the US banking system in about 15.2% and 14.5% the size of this shock,
respectively, with half-lives of 95 and 109 days, respectively.
4.2. Extended equation system
In this section, we discuss the main results from the analysis based on an ex-
tended set of economic areas. Together with the areas in SB, we consider the bank-
ing sectors in the UK, Scandinavian countries, and the BRICs subset of emerging-
market economies. This analysis offers a more complete picture and, furthermore,
offers us insight into the robustness of the overall conclusions to omitted variables.
As we discuss below, adding new representative countries (UK) or new economic
regions in both advanced and emerging areas (BR and SC) does not lead to any sig-
nificant change in the main conclusions. From a robustness perspective, this result
is important because it shows that the global index is able to control for the effects
of omitted areas in the analysis.
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Parameter estimates from the 2SQR estimation of the extended equation system
and bootstrapped significance through the maximum-entropy algorithm are pre-
sented in Table 5. The overall analysis of the parameter estimates leads to the same
conclusions discussed previously. Cross-country exposures largely increase and be-
come highly significant in both economic and statistical terms during periods of dis-
tress. Financial vulnerabilities show a considerable degree of heterogeneity across the
different areas involved, which can be related to the network of bilateral exposures
that characterize international diversification in these areas. Since none of the main
conclusions discussed previously change, we discuss directly the evidence related to
the new areas included in the analysis, focusing particularly on the UK.
While all the economic areas exhibit significant exposures to US shocks in stressed
conditions, the most vulnerable financial system to idiosyncratic shocks originating
in this area is the UK. According to the 2SQR estimates, a one percent change in the
expected losses of US increases expected losses in UK banks by 0.324 percentage
points. While it is well-known that the US and UK stock markets show strong sim-
ilarities (Shiller 1989), the ultimate reason for this remarked sensitivity is most likely
related to the fact that US-issued claims account for the largest portion of total for-
eign holdings within the UK banking system. According to Degryse et al. (2010),
US claims represent, on average, about 52% of the total foreign claims held by the
UK over BIS reporting countries. More generally, since large-scale banks in the UK
have engaged actively in international diversification since late 1990, the British sys-
tem shows large relative vulnerabilities to any of the remaining areas, particularly, the
CE. The vulnerability to this area is characterized by a contemporaneous spillover co-
efficient of 0.119. Not surprisingly, therefore, the UK financial system turns out to
be the most vulnerable area to global shocks in the sample, exhibiting a global spillo -
ver coefficient ξ of 0.224. Note that the size of this coefficient nearly doubles the size
of the estimated coefficients in the European regions.
Finally, regarding the vulnerability of other economic areas to shocks originating
in the UK financial system, the US exhibits the largest tail spillover coefficient (0.054).
This is not surprising, in the light that the UK represents about 30% of US-held for-
eign liabilities in other advanced economies (Degryse et al. 2010). Once more, this
result underlines the importance of cross-border diversification in defining the strength
of financial contagion across international areas.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have characterized the size, direction, and persistence of tail-
spillovers in the local banking industries of several major economic regions around
the world. A special focus has been given to address the heterogeneous patterns that
feature contagion as a consequence of state-dependent market environmental con-
ditions. To this end, we have considered a dynamic system of contemporaneous equa-
tions and implemented the 2SQR estimation methodology in Adams et al. (2014).
The most distinctive features of the procedure is that it builds on instrumental esti-
mation within the quantile regression setting to estimate state-dependent coefficients
and ensure robustness against endogeneity.
We have implemented a refinement of the original methodology and focused
on a system of equations in which the main variables involved are estimates of the
expected shortfall process, rather than the VaR process, of each economic area. In
our view, dealing with expected-shortfall loss functions can provide more accurate
estimation in downside-risk modelling, since expected shortfall is a coherent mea-
sure of risk and, more importantly, VaR-type measures can be insensitive to large
losses. We have used the expectile-based methodology in Taylor (2008a) to estimate
expected shortfall, thereby ensuring that the overall estimation process builds entirely
on semiparametric procedures which make results robust to the (unknown) distrib-
ution of the data. Finally, given the resultant estimates, we have estimated impulse-
response functions to determine the expected duration and time-profile of contagion.
The main evidence that emerges from this analysis essentially shows that the sen-
sitivity of expected losses in local banks to shocks initiated in or transmitted by for-
eign banks tends to be small and of little economic relevance during normal or tran-
quil period. However, cross-border vulnerabilities largely increase during periods of
financial distress, allowing idiosyncratic losses to quickly morph into systemic
shocks and spill over the remaining financial areas at a global scale. Our spillover sys-
tem is able to capture and quantify this expected result. The impulse-response analy-
sis agrees with this evidence, and further shows important differences on the expected
duration of shocks, showing that the size of contagion is more important and the ef-
fects more persistent under stressed conditions. This pattern, which emerges when an-
alyzing comovements in the left tails of the conditional distributions of returns
through a suitable methodology, cannot be uncovered by traditional methods focused
on the standard modelling of the conditional mean of returns, which perhaps explains
why systemic vulnerabilities did not received sufficient attention in the literature be-
fore the financial crisis. Another major conclusion of our analysis is that local vul-
nerabilities to foreign shocks exhibit a considerable degree of cross-country hetero-
geneity. Certain economic areas exhibit greater resilience to foreign shocks than other
areas and, similarly, the overall financial system is more vulnerable to shocks origi-
nated in certain areas. This evidence can be founded in the network of bilateral ex-
posures featured by international diversification strategies in the local industries as
well as bilateral borrowing activities across banks. Not surprisingly, therefore, the ma-
jor source of systemic contagion is the global banking system turns out to be the US
system, since large-scale banks around the world keep large holdings of securities is-
sued by US financial institutions in their balance sheets. In contrast, US banks, which
are known not to excessively over-rely on securities issued by a particular country,
are relatively more resilient against foreign shocks.
According to the estimates of the equation system, we note that Central EMU
area is fairly vulnerable to shocks originated in the Peripheral EMU, whereas the US
and Emerging economies exhibit weaker direct vulnerabilities to this area. This evi -
dence is fully consistent with the existence of cross-border exposures that feature con-
tagion in the banking industry. The same phenomenon explains the sheer vulnera-
bility of the US to shocks in the UK. Finally, the estimates of the model reveal the
existence of financial channels that introduce contagion in advanced economies
caused by shocks in emerging countries under market adverse conditions, which are
particularly relevant for the US. This result agrees the importance of the bilateral re-
lationships with certain countries, among which China takes a predominant position.
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The results in this paper are of particular interest for banking regulators and su-
pervisors as they provide insight on the empirical role played by international di-
versification in systemic risk. From a micro-prudential perspective, international di-
versification has been advocated as an effective tool to diversify away idiosyncratic
risks in traditional risk management practices. From a macro-prudential perspective,
however, international diversification increases the systemic importance of a finan-
cial institution as the bank becomes increasingly intertwined with foreign competi-
tors. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced in Decem-
ber 2011 an assessment methodology to identify Global Systemically Important
Banks (G-SIBs) based on five categories that include cross-border activity; see BCBS
(2011) for details. The evidence in this paper supports the central hypothesis under -
lying these regulation proposals, namely, that international diversification defines a
powerful channel of systemic contagion, particularly, under stressed conditions.
APPENDIX A: BANK INDEX DETAILS
In Section 2 we describe the dataset formed by international banking portfolios. This
appendix contains several tables that report the banks and countries that form the repre-
sentative indices of the local banking- industry in different economic regions such as the
US, BRICs, Peripheral EMU, Central EMU, Scandinavia, the UK, Emerging Markets
and the Global Banking index. This information is available in Datastream for the DS
Banks Index construction of each region. We report the banks and countries for specific
regional and country indices. In order to save space, we report the main areas and num-
ber of banks in emerging and global indices. Complete lists are available upon request.
Therefore, the following tables provide a list with the name and number of banks
and countries or areas included in every index.
Table A1: United States Index
Table A2: BRICS Index
Table A3: Peripheral EMU Index
Table A4: Central EMU Index
Table A5: United Kingdom Index
Table A6: Scandinavia Index
Table A7: Emerging Markets Index
Table A8: Global Banking Index
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Table A1: BANKS INCLUDED IN THE UNITED STATES INDEX
Bank Country
Bank of America US
Bankunited US
BB&T US
Bok Financial US
Citigroup US
City National US
Comerica US
Commerce Bancshares US
Credicorp US
Cullen Frost Bankers US
East West Bancorp US
Fifth Third Bancorp US
First Niagara Financial Group US
First Republic Bank US
Firstmerit US
Hudson City Bancorp US
Huntington Bancshares US
JP Morgan Chase and Company US
Keycorp US
M&T Bank US
New York Community Bancorp US
Peoples United Financial US
PNC Financial Services Group US
Prosperity Bancshares US
Regions Financial New US
Signature Bank US
Suntrust Banks US
SVB Financial Group US
Synovus Financial US
TFS Financial US
United States Bancorp US
Wells Fargo and Company US
Zions Bancorporation US
Total Number of Banks 33
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table A2: BANKS AND COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE BRICS INDEX
Bank Country
Banco Brasil On Brazil
Bradesco On Brazil
Bradesco PN Brazil
Itauunibanco On Brazil
Itauunibanco PN Brazil
Santander Bearer On Brazil
Santander Bearer PN Brazil
Agricultural Bank of China ‘H’ China
Bank of China ‘H’ China
Bank of Communications ‘H’ China
China Citic Bank ‘H’ China
China Construction Bank ‘H’ China
China Everbright Bank ‘H’ China
China Merchants Bank ‘H’ China
China Minsheng Banking ‘H’ China
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China ‘H’ China
Allahabad Bank India
Axis Bank India
Bank of Baroda India
Bank of India India
Canara Bank India
Central Bank of India India
Corporation Bank India
Federal Bank India
HDFC Bank India
I N G Vysya Bank India
Icici Bank India
Idbi Bank India
Indian Bank India
Indian Overseas Bank India
Indusind Bank India
Jammu and Kashmir Bank India
Oriental Bank of Commerce India
Punjab National Bank India
State Bank of India India
Syndicate Bank India
UCO Bank India
Union Bank of India India
Yes Bank India
Moscow Municipal Bank Moscow Russian Federation
Mosobl Bank Russian Federation
Rosbank Russian Federation
Sberbank of Russia Russian Federation
Sberbank Russia Preference Russian Federation
VTB Bank Russian Federation
Total Number of Banks 45
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table A3: BANKS AND COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE PERIPHERAL EMU INDEX
Bank Country
Alpha Bank Greece
Attica Bank Greece
Bank of Greece Greece
Bank of Piraeus Greece
Eurobank Ergasias Greece
General Bank of Greece Greece
National Bank of Greece Greece
Bank of Ireland Ireland
Banca Carige Italy
Banca Finnat Euramerica Italy
Banca Monte dei Paschi Italy
Banca Piccolo Credito Valtell Italy
Banca Popolare di Milano Italy
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Italy
Banca Popolare Emilia Romagna Italy
Banca Popolare Etruria Lazio Italy
Banca Profilo Italy
Banco di Desio E Della Brianza Italy
Banco Popolare Italy
Credito Bergamasco Italy
Credito Emiliano Italy
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy
Intesa Sanpaolo RSP Italy
Mediobanca Banca di Credito Financial Italy
Unicredit Italy
Unione di Banche Italian Italy
Banco BPI Portugal
Banco Comercial Portugues ‘R’ Portugal
Banco Espirito Santo Portugal
Banif Portugal
Montepio Portugal
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Spain
Banco de Sabadell Spain
Banco Intercontinental Espanol ‘R’ Spain
Banco Popular Espanol Spain
Banco Santander Spain
Bankia Spain
Caixabank Spain
Liberbank Spain
Total Number of Banks 39
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table A4: BANKS AND COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE CENTRAL EMU INDEX
Bank Country
Bank FUR Tirol und Vorarlberg Austria
Banks Bank Austria
Erste Group Bank Austria
Oberbank Austria
Oberbank Preference Austria
Raiffeisen Bank International Austria
Banque Nationale de Belgique Belgium
KBC Ancora Belgium
KBC Group Belgium
Hellenic Bank Cyprus
USB Bank Cyprus
Aktia ‘A’ Finland
Pohjola Pankki A Finland
Banque Nationale de Paris Paribas France
CIC ‘A’ France
Crcam Nord de France CCI France
Credit Agricole France
Credit Agricole Brie Picardie France
Credit Agricole Ile de France France
Credit Foncier de Monaco France
Natixis France
Societe Generale France
Commerzbank Germany
Deutsche Bank Germany
Deutsche Postbank Germany
IKB Deutsche Industriebank Germany
Oldenburgische Landesbank Germany
Umweltbank Germany
Espirito Santo Financial Group Luxembourg
Espirito Santo Financial Group Registered Luxembourg
Bank of Valletta Malta
Fimbank Malta
HSBC Bank Malta Malta
Lombard Bank Malta
American Hypobank Netherlands
Van Lanschot Netherlands
Abanka Vipa Slovenia
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor Slovenia
Probanka Prednostne Preference Slovenia
Total Number of Banks 39
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table A5: BANKS INCLUDED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEX
Bank Country
Bank of Georgia Holdings UK
Barclays UK
HSBC Holdings (Ordinary $0.50) UK
Lloyds Banking Group UK
Standard Chartered UK
Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK
Total Number of Banks 6
Source: Own elaboration.
Table A6: BANKS AND COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE SCANDINAVIAN INDEX
Bank Country
Danske Bank Denmark
Jyske Bank Denmark
Ringkjobing Landbobank Denmark
Spar Nord Bank Denmark
Sydbank Denmark
Aktia ‘A’ Finland
Pohjola Pankki A Finland
DNB Norway
Sparebank 1 Series Bank Norway
Sparebank 1 SMN Norway
Nordea Bank Sweden
SEB ‘A’ Sweden
Svenska Handelsbanken ‘A’ Sweden
Swedbank ‘A’ Sweden
Total Number of Banks 14
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table A7: NUMBER OF BANKS AND AREAS INCLUDED
IN THE EMERGING MARKETS INDEX
Number of Banks Area
33 Africa
118 Asia
45 BRICs
41 Europe
51 Latin America
Total Number of Banks 288
This table reports the main areas in the emerging markets index and the corresponding number of banks.
Africa is formed by Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa; Asia contains Bahrain, Dubai, Indonesia,
Jordan, Kuwait, Malasya, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand; Europe is
formed by Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. Finally,
Latin America is composed of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
Source: Own elaboration.
Table A8: NUMBER OF BANKS AND AREAS INCLUDED IN THE GLOBAL BANKING INDEX
Number of Banks Area
33 Africa
213 Asia
6 Australia
45 BRICs
8 Canada
38 Central EMU
51 Latin America
39 Peripheral EMU
57 Rest of Europe
14 Scandinavia
6 United kingdom
33 United States
Total Number of Banks 543
This table reports the main areas in the global banking index and the corresponding number of banks.
Africa is formed by Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa; Asia covers Abu Dabi, Bahrain,
Dubai, Dubai, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malasya, Oman, Pakistan, Phi-
lippines, Qatar, Singapur, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand; Latin America is comprised
of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Finally, rest of Europe is made up of
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia Switzerland and Turkey.
Source: Own elaboration.
APPENDIX B: SPILLOVER RESULTS USING VALUE AT RISK FROM GARCH APPROACH
AS A RISK MEASURE
In Section 4 we present the results for Expected Shortfall as a more coherent
measure than Value at Risk. In this appendix, we repeat the estimations for basic and
extended spillover equation system using VaR for λ = 0.01 instead of ES using the
GARCH-approach as in Adams et al. (2014). The main results for basic and extended
equation are presented in Table B1 and B2 respectively.
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RESUMEN
Este artículo analiza la vulnerabilidad de la industria bancaria en economías
avanzadas y emergentes frente a shocks en distintas áreas en periodos de
inestabilidad financiera. El principal objetivo es, por un lado, medir las sen-
sibilidades cruzadas entre las diferentes zonas que caracterizan el contagio
sistémico en el sistema bancario internacional. Por otro lado, se pretende ca-
racterizar la forma en la que se propagan los shocks sistémicos a lo largo del
tiempo. Para ello estimamos las sensibilidades de la función de pérdida es-
perada en la industria bancaria del cada área local frente a shocks contem-
poráneos en las funciones de pérdida esperada de las áreas extranjeras uti-
lizando un sistema de ecuaciones dinámico. Controlamos por exposiciones
globales a factores comunes y consideramos diferentes escenarios o estados
de inestabilidad económica. Para asegurar la robustez de las estimaciones
frente a la endogeneidad implementamos una estimación instrumental y cal-
culamos las funciones de impulso respuesta para analizar la duración espe-
rada del contagio en las colas. El estudio revela que las vulnerabilidades cru-
zadas entre países dependen del estado de la economía de tal forma que se
incrementan durante periodos de gran inestabilidad económica y tienen un
mayor efecto a largo plazo en el resto de sistemas. Por el contrario, para pe-
riodos más tranquilos los shocks tienen muy poco impacto y son rápidamente
absorvidos por los sistemas domésticos. El análisis también muestra evi-
dencia acerca de la existencia de direccionalidad en el contagio siendo US
el sector bancario que produce mayores contagios y el más resistente frente
a shocks en otras áreas. Obtenemos también que las exposiciones sistemá-
ticas al área de Europa Central son más significativas que a la Europa Peri-
férica, siendo US el país más vulnerable frente a shocks originados en Eu-
ropa Central. Finalmente, US y la Eurozona son sensibles frente a shocks
en el sistema bancario de la zona de países emergentes.
Palabras clave: contagio bancario, SDSVaR, expectiles.
Clasificación JEL: C23, G15, Q43.
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